The Defence and Foreign Policy of an Independent Scotland

Key Considerations

Dr. John MacDonald & Dr. Norrie MacQueen

August 2014
Contents

4 Introduction
5 Defending an Independent Scotland
6 Beyond Home Defence
8 Peaceful Democratic Transition and Disarmament
9 Conclusion
9 End Notes
The Defence and Foreign Policy of an Independent Scotland

Key Considerations

Authors’
Dr JOHN MACDONALD is Director of the independent think-tank Scottish Global Forum.

Dr NORRIE MACQUEEN is Honorary Research Fellow in the School of International Relations at St Andrews University and has published a number of books on the United Nations and peacekeeping. He was part of the Democratic Governance Support Unit of the UN peacekeeping mission in Timor-Leste in the final phase of its mandate in 2012.

www.allofusfirst.org
The Defence and Foreign Policy of an Independent Scotland

Key Considerations

Introduction

How would an independent Scotland prioritise its defence and external relations? How would it provision itself in order to secure those priorities? How would it look to act in the world and what activities would it seek to become involved in?

Absent the supernatural gift of foresight, it is difficult to make concrete predictions in a chaotically unpredictable world. What we can be certain of is that independence would give Scotland the opportunity to press ‘reset’ on how it engages with that world. We can be certain also that an independent Scotland’s international outlook would be different to that of the United Kingdom (UK). It would make no sense for Scotland to try to recreate what the UK currently has and does in defence and foreign policy terms. Scotland would be an international actor of a fundamentally different character from the UK yet this should not be viewed in a negative light. On the contrary, it is possible to say that, in defence and foreign policy terms, independence could bring six key benefits, both for Scotland and the broader international community.

Scotland would be an international actor of a fundamentally different character from the UK.

First, independence would allow Scotland to reduce its military spending. Scottish taxpayers make a vast contribution to the UK defence budget each year of over £3 billion – this is more than Denmark spends annually on its entire national defence. A substantial reduction in defence expenditure would still allow Scotland to maintain effective armed forces. Rejecting nuclear weapons and costly platforms such as aircraft carriers would not only make lesser demands on the Scottish tax purse, it would also ensure that those monies which were allocated to the defence budget would be spent on equipment and resources more appropriate to Scotland’s needs.

Second, independence would allow Scottish governments to develop a defence and foreign policy model which better reflects Scotland’s interests. The UK places great value upon its expeditionary capabilities and its ability to ‘project power’ in the conventional military sense. However historically (and not so historically), this approach has invited international criticism due to the damage that has sometimes been visited upon the ‘recipients’ of this projected power. This approach has also been criticised due to the impact that it has had upon the UK’s domestic security provision; the costly emphasis on the ‘global’ has inevitably impacted upon how much is available to spend domestically. A neglect of the home front has facilitated vast losses to the national revenue base and various risks and harms to citizens and to the physical environment. An independent Scotland should orientate its security focus by prioritising – first and foremost – the security of Scotland’s land, sea and people.

Third, this reorientation of focus need not constrain an independent Scotland’s capacity to contribute to international peace and security through the deployment of its military forces. On the contrary, a sovereign Scotland able to distance itself from the UK and its historical (and contemporary) global ambitions could potentially find a place with such countries as Norway, Canada and Ireland among the ‘elite’ of middle-power peacekeepers.

Fourth, an independent Scotland’s ‘military behaviour’ would be guided by specific, dedicated articles within a written constitution. This would place publicly-stated constraints on how Scottish governments could use the nation’s armed forces. Importantly, this would also give Scottish governments recourse to constitutional protection against taking action in instances where they were solicited by other international actors to ‘get involved’ in military operations which might be of questionable morality, or which might be considered against Scotland’s national interests. Moreover, enshrining the illegality of nuclear weapons into a written Scottish constitution would also provide critical democratic weight in negotiations over the removal of UK nuclear weapons from Scotland.

Fifth, its relative detachment from the UK’s foreign and security policy should result in an independent Scotland facing a much reduced exposure to recognized security threats such as transnational terrorism. Indeed, independence – and the peaceful democratic manner in which it would be achieved – could provide the basis for a distinctive Scottish ‘international brand’ which emphasizes cooperation, dialogue and peace. Scotland’s international outreach could also emphasise its experience of transitioning into a nuclear-weapons-free-zone; this experience could be a major platform for an independent Scotland’s future diplomatic efforts.
Sixth, there would be positive economic and employment implications from having a Scottish defence infrastructure based in Scotland, and staffed by salaried personnel who are overwhelmingly resident – and who would thus have their financial base – in Scotland. Making this observation is not to genuflect towards the military-industrial-complex; it is instead a rational acceptance that independent Scottish governments would devote considerable annual expenditure to national security and that a substantial proportion of this expenditure would be contained within Scotland. In contemplating the implications of this scenario, it is hard not to see the economic and employment benefits which would accrue and which would touch all sections of Scottish society.

Having earmarked six key implications of independence for Scotland’s defence and international outreach, we now proceed to set out in more detail what an independent Scottish defence and foreign policy might look like. We first examine Scotland’s national defence; in doing so, we illuminate what we see as the key priorities and how these priorities might best be addressed.

We then move on to consider the question of how an independent Scotland might act in the world. In providing an answer to this question, we emphasise pathways which might facilitate a meaningful Scottish contribution to the international agenda but which at the same time acknowledge the current Scottish government’s stated intention that an independent Scotland would be a ‘good citizen’ within the international community.

We conclude our analysis by considering briefly some key financial considerations. Various factors are acknowledged. We conclude that the defence and foreign policy model depicted here is not only affordable but that it could be delivered and maintained for less than Scottish taxpayers currently pay.

Defending an independent Scotland

In considering a defence model for an independent Scotland, Scottish military planners should prioritise an approach which we term ‘securing the perimeter’. This approach gives primacy to patrolling and defending Scotland’s sizeable coastline, territorial waters, exclusive marine economic zone and airspace. The emphasis here must always be on the protection of Scotland’s people and national resources. Such a commitment would require an effective Scottish navy, air force, coastguard service and customs agency whose combined efforts would be directed principally towards (in no particular order) aerial and maritime surveillance and patrol, customs enforcement, search and rescue operations, environmental monitoring, fisheries protection and shipping safety.

There is much to commend the wisdom of this approach. Scotland is pre-eminently a maritime nation whose sea area is more than five times larger than its land area. It has over 11,000 km of highly indented coastline – amounting to approximately 61% of the total UK coastline – and over 800 islands. Scotland’s seas (defined as territorial its waters together with its Exclusive Economic Zone as set by the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea) extend outwards 200 nautical miles. The waters within this boundary form Scotland’s recognised fishing limits, giving it a total sea area of 468,994 square km. By contrast, relatively narrow bodies of water – the North Sea and the North Channel of the Irish Sea – are all that separate Scotland from continental Europe and Ireland respectively.

Scottish military planners should prioritise an approach which we term ‘securing the perimeter’.

Scotland’s physical characteristics and location confer many benefits but they also carry risks. A newly independent Scotland should look to develop its defence model around those risks. Precisely what should be prioritised – and why – is considered in greater detail below.

Maritime surveillance and monitoring

Activities in Scotland’s seas are certain to increase in the coming decades, perhaps most notably across the various energy fields and by virtue of increased sea traffic due to the opening up of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). These activities and their impacts should be monitored and addressed in order to maintain both ecological integrity and maritime industry safety in the seas around Scotland.

The upsurge in NSR activity is just one key issue which highlights the importance of careful policy preparation. Recent years have seen Russia asserting its dominance of the NSR as it seeks to extract and transport its vast northern energy and mineral resources. It has set up a new state agency called the Northern Sea Route Administration (NSRA) tasked with deciding tariffs and regulations for the passage of ships through the NSR, processing applications from shipping companies for such passage, and granting or refusing permissions.

By its own admission, the NSRA will significantly increase the permissions it grants for passage through the NSR in the coming years, overwhelmingly for Russian ships. In 2013 around 1.5 million tonnes of traffic were estimated to have been carried through the NSR; the Russian government predicts that by 2015 this figure will reach 4 million tonnes.

Given that Russia is frequently criticised for its poor environmental record in both the maritime and the energy
extraction fields, these developments should be watched with concern from Scotland.

With this in mind, it seems clear that greater priority should be given to the protection of Scotland's vital marine environment; indeed, this commitment should form a central pillar of an effective Scottish defence model. Twenty years after the MV Braer ran aground off Shetland, spilling 85,000 tonnes of crude oil into the sea, the UK government continues to demonstrate a worryingly lax view of the risks that such accidents pose to fragile marine environments.(5) An intensification of NSR traffic, and worsening weather events associated with global warming, serve only to add to the risks in the seas around Scotland.

A Scottish coastguard service would be tasked with addressing these and other concerns. This would be a single agency overseen by the Scottish navy (in a similar fashion to Norwegian practice) and it would be tasked primarily with maritime search and rescue, fisheries protection, shipping safety, environmental monitoring, and also support for education and research.

**Customs enforcement**

Scotland's close proximity to continental Europe and Ireland facilitates a range of smuggling activities around and through Scotland. These have included the transportation of – amongst other things – contraband cigarettes and alcohol, people trafficked for labour and the sex industry, and weapons arriving in or passing through Scotland. These activities do considerable damage to government revenues; they also greatly undermine human security.(6)

The smuggling of contraband tobacco provides an instructive example of why a Scottish defence model should include an effective customs enforcement and border control capability. With both countries levying the highest levels of excise duty on tobacco in the EU, the UK and Ireland are inundated with smuggled tobacco products. HM Revenue and Customs estimate that in 2012-2013, 16% of cigarette and 48% of hand-rolling tobacco in the UK was illicit (non-duty paid), at a cost to the UK economy of between £2 and £3 billion.(7)

The significance of this issue extends well beyond the huge economic loss to the taxpayer.

The significance of this issue extends well beyond the huge economic loss to the taxpayer. Smuggling is also known to be intimately linked to a variety of other criminal endeavours. In the UK, tobacco smuggling is closely associated with organized criminal gangs and their various activities in fields such as drug trafficking, human trafficking and weapons procurement. Human trafficking to the UK rose by one-quarter across the 2012-2013 period; sex trafficking in the UK (of adults and children) is also on the rise.(8)

The Irish authorities contend that the illegal tobacco trade channels tens of millions of pounds each year to dissident republican groups; it would be naïve to think that Scotland is irrelevant to, or unaffected by, these activities.(9) In Scotland itself, the illicit tobacco trade is rising sharply and it has been widely reported that 'Triad gangs' operating between China and Scotland make over £10 million per year in Scotland through illegal sales of smuggled rolling tobacco alone.(10)

The UK government has acknowledged that it is struggling to address smuggling and the various collateral criminal activities it sustains.(11) An independent Scotland should seek to address identifiable deficiencies. A properly provisioned Scottish customs agency could make great strides towards securing the integrity of Scotland’s borders by detecting and deterring the unlawful movement of goods and people into and around the country. This agency would work closely with other bodies, in particular the national police service, the Scottish coastguard service and the Scottish air force. It would also liaise closely with partner agencies in the UK and Ireland, as well as in continental Europe.

**Beyond home defence**

As well as planning the defence of immediate domestic interests, those charged with governing a newly independent Scotland would also have to contemplate how the nation would act beyond its own geographical ambit. An independent Scotland would have the opportunity to sculpt its own approach to foreign affairs, one based upon distinctive Scottish preferences (and aversions). This approach would doubtless be guided in no small part by Scotland's pre-independence experience of the UK's approach to defence and foreign affairs. In engaging with the international arena, what would characterise the Scottish approach? Just how would an independent Scotland act in the world?

Whilst a Scottish approach to foreign affairs would doubtless be characterized by a commitment to multilateral cooperation, this is not to say that Scotland would be deprived of the opportunity to take unilateral decisions which had a significant international impact. If we look to how other small and medium-sized states have embraced this opportunity, we see some alluring possibilities. For example, in 2013, Luxembourg and Sweden were – respectively – the first and second most generous state donors of humanitarian assistance funding to programmes tackling fragility, poverty, conflict vulnerability and natural disaster. (12) This level of commitment is very much at the discretion of national governments; the example set by these states is one that governments of an independent Scotland might choose to follow.

Providing humanitarian aid need not be Scotland’s only contribution to international crises. An independent Scotland
could also forge a reputation as an effective contributor to international peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. This commitment would potentially see Scottish forces deployed around the world, under the banner of the United Nations or the European Union.

The opportunity to work with the United Nations (UN) may in fact come fairly soon for a newly independent Scotland. Given the pressure on global peacekeeping resources since the end of the Cold War, it is highly likely that the planners in the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations would quickly approach the government of a newly independent Scotland requesting a peacekeeping contribution. Uncoupled from the United Kingdom with its imperial history, its more recent controversial military interventions and its nuclear status, an independent Scotland would likely provide a particularly attractive option for peacekeeping agencies.(13)

Historically, the peacekeeping role has suited states of Scotland’s size and outlook. Indeed, a commitment to this role has both enhanced and defined the foreign policy profiles of a number of small and middle powers in recent decades. For example, from the 1950s onwards, UN peacekeeping has been a central function of the Irish Defence Force and this commitment has dramatically raised Ireland’s (hitherto minimal) international standing. Recent shifts in the operational nature of peacekeeping – with a move towards the increased utilisation of international civilian police forces (UNPOLs) in civil conflicts – would also offer clear opportunities for the successor service to Police Scotland.(14) Peacekeeping is facilitated through far more than just military components.

It is important to note also that participation in peace operations brings considerable benefits to the peacekeeper as well as to the ‘peacekept’. Peacekeeping missions provide operational experience to national military forces which are neither configured for nor likely to be involved in bilateral conflict. Involvement in such missions also provides opportunities for the development and dissemination of good military practice. Furthermore, those benefits are largely cost-free in economic terms since the United Nations underwrites its operations financially.

In the cases of Norway and Canada, moreover, the peacekeeping role has extended beyond the conflict-zone and into the political arena. By virtue of their positive international standing, these nations have been given more explicitly political responsibilities in acting as mediators and ‘honest brokers’ across a range of international conflicts. Such a commitment to international peace and security – whether by direct operational involvement or by political facilitation – obviously provides a powerful expression of a state’s soft power. If an independent Scotland wished to place soft power at the heart of its foreign policy, then a commitment to the politics and activities of peacekeeping would go a long way towards demonstrating its credentials as a ‘good citizen’ within the international community.

In short, a prominent role in international peace operations could offer Scotland an array of positive opportunities on the world stage. The peacekeeping role could deliver tangible operational benefits to Scotland’s military and police forces, and a positive boost to Scotland’s global reputation.

However, an independent Scotland’s contribution to international operations need not reside solely in peacekeeping. Scottish military forces could be involved in a variety of other commitments as well. Whilst they would be heavily employed in the waters around Scotland, Scottish naval vessels might also be deployed further afield, working for the common good. A Scottish navy could, for example, contribute to the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Mechanism (SHADE), the multinational and multi-agency grouping tasked with leading anti-piracy operations in international waters. (15) Such a commitment might see Scottish vessels patrolling alongside those of other nations in the Indian Ocean, in order to protect vital shipping lanes.

A commitment to peacekeeping would go a long way towards demonstrating an independent Scotland’s credentials as a ‘good citizen’.

More controversial would be the prospect of seeing the Scottish military forces operating in conflict zones in a role other than multilateral peacekeeping. Membership of international alliances can present member states with requests to deploy their forces as part of an allied mission; states cannot always refuse to participate in such missions if they wish to be seen as reliable contributory partners. It is well known that NATO has the capacity to make such requests of its member states through the mutual defence clause enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.(16) However, it is less well known that mutual defence obligations are also attached to EU membership – the Treaty of Lisbon (which came into force in December 2009) contains a mutual defence clause which asserts that ‘if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power…’ (17)

Any deployment of Scottish military forces – even if on a modest scale or in a role other than direct combat – would be controversial and would come under critical public-political scrutiny. The risks attached to such deployments could, however, be greatly mitigated by having dedicated articles enshrined into a written constitution. Any such constitution would have the capacity to minimize any tendency towards ‘bad military behaviour’ on the part of an independent Scotland. Precisely what a Scottish constitution would have to say vis-à-vis the use of the state’s security forces should be clearly thought through if this document is to act as an effective check on a Scottish government’s capacity to deploy...
the nation’s military resources overseas, especially if any such deployment involved the use of military force.

**Peaceful democratic transition and disarmament**

An independent Scotland would not only engage with and contribute to international politics through its military capabilities. Scotland already has a strong ‘international brand’; if it voted for its independence, there is little doubt that that brand would be strengthened still further by virtue of the peaceful democratic nature of how independence was attained.

If the current Scottish government’s plans for the eviction of Trident from the national territory come to fruition, an independent Scotland could credibly claim to have furthered the international non-proliferation agenda. A scenario in which the UK government was forced to reduce or even surrender its nuclear posture as a consequence of Scotland’s peaceful democratic secession and rejection of the UK’s nuclear weapons would send a message of hope to anti-nuclear campaigners the world over. It would reinvigorate those who campaign against nuclear weapons because they would have tangible proof that concerted democratic opposition to nuclear weapons can actually lead to nuclear disarmament.

**Of lasting value would be the setting up of a Scottish Institute for Peace and Disarmament.**

If the UK did ultimately have to abandon its nuclear posture due to the pressures imposed by Scotland’s secession, Scotland could seek to build upon this success in a variety of ways. For example, it might mark its ‘freedom’ from Trident by hosting a major international conference on nuclear disarmament to coincide with the date of the final exit of the UK nuclear force from Scotland.

Of more lasting value however, would be the setting up of a Scottish Institute for Peace and Disarmament (SIPD) whose research, networking and outreach could nourish international efforts on peace, non-proliferation and weapons reduction, and cement Scotland’s international reputation as a state dedicated towards those ends. SIPD could provide a repository of research and education on Scotland’s own fight against nuclear weapons and its peaceful democratic transition towards statehood. Such an institution could make Scotland an authoritative voice in the fields of disarmament, demilitarisation and conflict reduction, and it could be the hub of Scotland’s capacity to develop and deploy the military, political, diplomatic and economic instruments necessary to deal with proliferation threats, democracy promotion and conflict reduction. This institute and its work would complement well any possible Scottish commitment to international peacekeeping activities, as discussed above.

**Costing and affordability**

Could Scotland afford to mount a defence and foreign policy posture of the kind outlined above? There are several factors to consider here. The development of a new Scottish defence infrastructure would be underpinned by Scotland’s agreed 8.4% population share of UK defence assets. The Ministry of Defence’s Annual Report and Accounts for 2012-13 lists the UK’s total asset value at £92.28 billion. Based upon a population share of this sum, we can assume that in the aftermath of a ‘Yes’ vote, Scottish negotiators would enter discussions with Ministry of Defence representatives looking to secure the transfer of military equipment, infrastructure and – where appropriate, cash – to the value of around £7.75 billion.

This substantial sum would be sufficient to fund the initial development of Scotland’s defence infrastructure; it would also underwrite commitments such as Scotland’s contribution to Trident removal costs. Lastly, it would fund the procurement of key high-cost items for the Scottish Defence Force such as naval vessels and aircraft.

There are other factors to bear in mind when considering the size of a newly independent Scotland’s ‘defence fund’. It must be accepted that a Scottish defence force would start life with a modest proportion of its overall required force strength; it would initially be staffed with trained personnel who had transferred from service in the UK forces. What would follow would be a transition period, during which time the numbers of trained Scottish military personnel would gradually build up to full complement. For example, under the Scottish government’s plans as designated in its White Paper, Scottish troop numbers would build towards a force of 20,000 (15,000 regulars and 5,000 reservists) over a period of ten years.

From an economic perspective, there are positives to be taken from this situation. Given that salaries typically account for around half of any annual military budget, shortfalls in military personnel experienced in the early years of Scottish independence would leave a surplus from within the salary budget which could be reallocated for other uses. Alternatively, that surplus could be banked in order to reserve funding for future developments. Whilst this surplus would clearly diminish incrementally with each year it took to reach full personnel strength, each of those ‘short’ years would create extra finance.

What would it cost annually to maintain Scotland’s defence? Scottish taxpayers currently make a vast contribution to the UK defence budget of over £3 billion per year; this is more than countries such as Denmark and Finland spend annually on their defence. The Scottish government intends dedicating £2.5 billion each year to defence, a figure equivalent to the annual Danish defence budget. It is reasonable to assume that an independent Scotland could develop a Danish-scale military force structure for itself on this budget, albeit one tailored specifically to Scottish requirements. Committing to this model on the Scottish government’s specified budget would also see...
Scottish taxpayers paying around £800 million per year less than they do on defence under current UK arrangements.

We should be mindful also that – as noted above – United Nations peacekeeping is at least cost-neutral to national contributors (often it actually represents a net financial gain to contributors) as all costs are borne by the UN. If an independent Scotland were to commit itself to the international peacekeeping agenda, the benefits of doing so could thus be viewed not just in operational and normative terms but also in economic.

It thus seems clear that defending an independent Scotland and contributing to the wider task of international peacekeeping would make far lesser demands on Scottish taxpayers. Furthermore, a Scottish defence budget would not be consumed by big-ticket items such as nuclear weapons and £3 billion aircraft carriers, thus maximising the chances that money allocated to a Scottish defence budget would be spent on equipment and resources appropriate to Scotland’s needs. The absence of such financially draining items would also – it is hoped – minimize the chances that a Scottish defence ministry would face the budgetary overstretch experienced by the MoD in London, an overstretch which has prevented adequate investment in key areas such as housing for military personnel. 

The question of whether an independent Scotland could afford to sustain international aid funding at the level that Luxembourg commits to would ultimately depend upon the willingness of future Scottish governments. The current Scottish government has declared its intention that an independent Scotland would meet the UN-designated target of spending of 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on Official Development Assistance. It asserts that it would like to see this commitment enshrined in binding legislation; it asserts also that it would look to work towards a 1% commitment in the longer term. (23) The government of Luxembourg has made just such a commitment, formally announcing its intention to maintain the nation’s overseas aid contributions at 1% of GNI. (24) There is little doubt that an independent Scotland could look to follow Luxembourg’s lead and in doing so, placing soft power very much at the centre of a Scottish foreign and security approach.

Conclusion

Six implications of independence were set out at the beginning of this paper. They articulate clear reasons why a break from the UK model of defence and foreign policy should not be viewed with trepidation by Scotland’s people. These implications also offer a promising framework for a uniquely Scottish security and foreign policy.

The guiding principle of this policy should be that it meets Scotland’s immediate national security needs but that it also provides a platform from which Scotland can contribute to the wellbeing of the wider international community. Scotland’s territorial integrity and the security of its inhabitants must be safeguarded by such a policy, but hand-in-hand with this must go a contribution to international peace and security beyond the geo-political horizons of the national territory.

There need be no tension between these two dimensions to an independent security and foreign policy; indeed, they are complementary. The projection of soft power – whether through peacekeeping contributions, international mediation, overseas aid contributions, or the provision of a route map to disarmament – would greatly enhance positive perceptions of Scotland within the international community. This in turn would help reduce Scotland’s vulnerability to the security risk which arguably represents the principal threat to modern states; terrorism. Interdependence in the contemporary world extends beyond trade and economics; it has a moral and ethical dimension as well. The priorities and actions of an independent Scotland should acknowledge this.

The projection of soft power would greatly enhance positive perceptions of Scotland within the international community.

The task of formulating a security and foreign policy for a new state is by any terms a formidable one. It is also one which must be undertaken by drawing on the broadest possible range of inputs; ideally, it will reflect a truly national spectrum of interests. Of all the areas of public policy, it is unquestionably the case that security and foreign affairs have traditionally been the most jealously guarded preserve of the ruling elites. Independence would give Scotland the opportunity to break with this self-perpetuating and invariably cynical approach. A truly ‘national’ foreign policy must be exactly that – ‘national’ – in the purposes that it serves, in the benefits it confers, and in the image it portrays to the world.

With the emergence of a properly consensual vision of how the nation’s international vocation should be pursued, an independent Scotland would be in a position not only to safeguard the security of its people in an uncertain global environment but also, however modestly, to shape that environment for the better.

End Notes

(1) Scotland’s sea area statistics drawn from calculations made from the Scottish Government’s website at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/03/16182005/21

(2) Visit the NSRA website at: http://www.arctic-liio.com/nsr_nsr

(3) Arvind Gupta, ‘Northern Sea Route: Humming with Activity’.
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 27th August 2013 at: http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/NorthernSeaRoute_agupta_270513


(6) Author interview with a military source with extensive experience on cross-border and anti-smuggling operations, both in the UK and overseas. This individual is still serving and expressed the desire to remain anonymous. August 2013.


(9) Jamie Smyth, ‘Security: smoking out the smugglers’. Financial Times online, 1st September 2013 at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5d7b8b00-0fe3-11e3-a258-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2gTqzL9Vq

(10) Paul O’Hare, ‘Revealed: Triads raking in £10 million as they flood Scotland with counterfeit tobacco’. Daily Record, 17th October 2012.


(14) On the full range and nature of the peacekeeping ‘project’ see the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/


www.allofusfirst.org